Shopping For Mass Destruction

Despite successes in its nuclear and missile programmes over the past few years, North Korea still relies on external sources of technology to supply its weapons programmes and will continue to do so in the long term. Procurement networks with tentacles all around the world have been used by the country to obtain technology from willing exporters and naive businesses, and to dupe those trying to comply with export controls over the past decades. These networks will continue to be key to the sustainment of North Korea’s programmes and further technological progress.

This paper analyses North Korea’s procurement networks, particularly in view of North Korea’s programmatic successes and recent geopolitical shifts in Russia’s relationship with North Korea as a result of the war in Ukraine. The paper draws on underexploited source material to offer an overview of North Korea’s procurement networks over the past five years. It finds that North Korea’s networks are active and will remain so, and are likely seeking to make up for the slowdown in procurement during the period of Covid-19-related border closures, and to fulfil recent Russian orders for missile technology.

The networks are largely focused in China and Russia, where North Korean operatives – trading company personnel, diplomats, intelligence officers, and scientists and researchers – have been able to operate largely unhindered, allowing them to establish supply chains. However, there are still some needs that see North Korea looking to manufacturers in the US, Europe, Japan and other markets to fulfil. North Korea’s renewed relationship with Russia is perhaps the most important factor that will shape the future of the country’s procurement networks. Any formal offer of strategic technologies by Moscow to Pyongyang, or actions that see North Korean operatives openly purchase on a larger scale from Russian providers, would be bountiful for North Korea’s procurement needs.

Other factors will also shape the nature of North Korea’s procurement networks into the future, including evolving needs and greater requirements for highly specialised technologies provided by a smaller number of niche suppliers. Overall, the paper concludes that despite North Korea’s successes, seeking to prevent the country’s access to, and procurement of, technology is still valuable. It makes 10 recommendations to those seeking to counter North Korea’s illicit procurement.

Introduction

Despite successes in its nuclear and missile programmes over the past few years, North Korea still relies on external sources of technology to supply its weapons programmes. Long subject to extensive UN sanctions prohibiting exports of many of these technologies to North Korea, Pyongyang has made extensive use of illicit procurement networks to access these technologies. These networks, with tentacles all around the world, obtain the goods from a mix of willing exporters and naive businesses, and by duping those trying to comply with export controls.

These external technologies – from materials and components, to machine tools and other manufacturing equipment, to sensitive design information and expertise – have allowed North Korea to advance its nuclear and missile programmes. The goods, manufacturing technologies and expertise, along with extensive domestic investment, have allowed North Korea to build up its indigenous WMD-related expertise and industrial base. This has led to the apparent growth of the country’s nuclear arsenal, which – while public estimates are scant – has been said by US intelligence sources to number up to 60 warheads. North Korea has also successfully developed ICBMs and systems with shorter ranges, seemingly of domestic design.

A reassessment of North Korea’s procurement of foreign technology is timely. In the medium to long term, North Korea will continue to rely on imported technologies and its procurement networks as its nuclear and missile arsenals develop. Recent geopolitical developments have also worked to open up North Korea’s opportunities to benefit from external sources of technology. After North Korea’s renewal of its relationship with Russia, rumours emerged that Moscow will offer strategic technologies to Pyongyang in return for arms transfers for use in Ukraine.

Russia’s flagrant violation of the UN arms embargo, as well as China dragging its feet over sanctions, has put the UN sanctions regime on life support. These states, both with extensive strategic industries, have been significant targets for North Korea’s technology procurement efforts. China is also the main transhipment hub for goods en route to North Korea. However, despite the potential impending disintegration of the UN sanctions regime, seeking to implement supply-side controls and continuing to counter North Korea’s illicit procurement is still valuable.

Besides Russia and China, many states with companies that produce technology of value to North Korea’s procurement – particularly the US, Europe and Japan – remain on board with sanctions on North Korea. There are also many other states that have sought and will continue to seek to prevent technology leaking out to North Korea’s programme. States seeking to counter North Korea’s procurement will also continue to make the case for sanctions implementation to a range of states that can and will occasionally act as transhipment or re-export hubs for nuclear- and missile-related technology.

Given this continued role for UN sanctions and the need to make the case to partners, an up-to-date examination of North Korea’s WMD-related procurement efforts is a timely and important aid to sanctions implementation. Analysis is also pertinent given the expiry of the mandate of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 Committee Panel of Experts (PoE) in April 2024. The dissolution of the PoE represents a blow to sanctions monitoring and implementation. This paper offers a baseline analysis for further outreach on sanctions implementation to counter North Korea’s illicit procurement. It is hoped this is especially useful for governments, their intelligence and customs bodies, and the private sector.

Data Challenges and Existing Research

While there has been some focused research on North Korea’s nuclear and missile procurement activities, no recent works have considered them in detail. The limited work in this area is largely due to the challenges of access to data, with much of North Korea’s programmes completely hidden from view. Studies of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes have tended to provide broader overviews.

Specifically on the nuclear side, lack of access to North Korean facilities – and, indeed, as key elements of North Korea’s uranium enrichment programme are unknown to outsiders – means that little is understood about the scope of North Korea’s programmes and the technologies that are used. There is more information in the public domain on the missile programme, with images and footage of increasingly frequent missile tests, parades and factory visits published by the regime, as well as missile test wreckage fished off the bed of the sea, or more recently from impact sites in Ukraine.

Discerning the balance of North Korea’s import of technology from overseas, either by overt assistance or illicit procurement, and its domestic industrial capacity, has been a particular challenge. For the nuclear programme, on top of the lack of insights into North Korean facilities, there have been few cases of seizure of goods destined for the programme, providing little insight into foreign dependencies. There is more, albeit limited, data on the missile programme that can be used to analyse North Korea’s successes.

While limited in number, there are some more focused works on North Korea’s procurement networks. Some analysis has considered the procurement of specific technologies, while others have focused on the role of certain types of entities in North Korea’s procurement and arms trading activities. Still others have looked at North Korea’s knowledge networks and the procurement of “intangible” technology – the design information, sensitive data and knowledge that accompanies tangible goods, components and systems.

Some of these more focused works are based on information from almost a decade ago, with North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes having since progressed significantly. Taking stock of the situation as much as is possible through an up-to-date and more holistic treatment will help frame future efforts to counter the country’s procurement networks. This is particularly necessary in view of the dissolution of the UN PoE.

Methodology, Hypothesis and Structure

This paper seeks to provide an up-to-date analysis of North Korea’s illicit procurement – the technologies it is seeking, its procurement apparatus and modus operandi – focusing on the period since the last UN North Korea sanctions resolution was passed in 2017. The paper uses a range of newer sources that have so far had limited consideration. The more recent reports of the now defunct PoE have included details on procurement efforts, including several detailed cases since 2017. US designations from as recently as 2023 and detailed guidance on countering North Korea’s illicit procurement for its missile programme from 2020 also offer new insights.

Wreckage of North Korean missiles recovered from the battlefields of Ukraine also offers new perspectives on the contents of North Korean weapons. In addition, the paper fills in some gaps in the history of North Korea’s procurement from recent UK National Archives finds from the 1980s and early 1990s. The data from these under-used sources is combined with insights from several interviews with nuclear and missile proliferation experts, cited anonymously due to the sensitivity of the subject matter.

The paper argues that in the medium to long term, North Korea will continue to rely on imported technology and its procurement networks as its nuclear and missile arsenals develop. Since 2017, these procurement networks have been active in a range of areas, and particularly in dual-use technologies (those with both military and civilian applications). The paper shows that these networks will continue to be active as they make up for the slowdown in procurement during the period of Covid-19-related border closures, and as they work to procure technology for domestic uses, as well as to compensate for the goods used in producing missiles exported to the new Russian market.

The paper contends that North Korea’s procurement networks are largely focused on China and Russia. In these jurisdictions, North Korea’s agents operate with little risk of reprisal, and have been able to establish supply chains for a growing number of requisite technologies. However, North Korea still has needs or interests that result in Pyongyang looking to manufacturers in the US, Europe, Japan and other markets through intermediaries, as is demonstrated by the electronic components inside North Korean missile wreckage recovered from Ukraine. Desire for certain quality products, or a preference for goods from these countries, could ensure continued interest in these markets.

Pyongyang’s renewed relationship with Moscow is perhaps the most important factor that will shape the future of North Korea’s procurement networks. North Korea has supplied arms and ballistic missiles for use in Ukraine, and Pyongyang and Moscow signed a mutual defence treaty in June 2024. If Moscow were to formally offer strategic technologies to Pyongyang, or to allow North Korea’s procurement operatives to openly shop on a larger scale from Russian providers, this could be bountiful for North Korea’s needs. Other factors will also shape the nature of North Korea’s networks into the future, including evolving technological developments and greater requirements for highly specialised technologies held by a smaller number of niche suppliers.

This paper, which seeks to provide insights to non-governmental analysts, government officials and industry practitioners, has five chapters. Chapter I gives a historical overview of North Korea’s technology procurement, emphasising that it has been a long-term buyer from the international marketplace, and highlighting continuity in approaches. Chapter II considers a loose typology of the equipment and goods that North Korea is pursuing and the UN sanctions that have sought to prevent technology transfer. Chapter III analyses North Korea’s more recent illicit procurement activities to understand current procurement priorities. Chapter IV takes a closer look at the entities involved in North Korea’s WMD-related illicit procurement, while Chapter V considers its future. The paper concludes with 10 recommendations to counter North Korea’s future illicit procurement.

I. Historical Sources of Technology

North Korea has long exploited external sources of technology to develop its nuclear and missile programmes. This chapter provides a brief historical overview for context and asks two pertinent questions: Where has North Korea’s WMD technology come from? And what was the role of illicit procurement? The chapter highlights the continuity in North Korea’s procurement approaches and methods over the past 50 years, showing that Pyongyang has, through necessity, used illicit procurement networks and methods to obtain military and strategic technologies.

Supply-side controls have been used since at least the 1980s to prevent support to North Korea’s WMD programmes (see Box 1). During the Cold War, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCoM) sought to prevent the transfer of Western technology to communist states, including North Korea. According to declassified CIA assessments, North Korea went on a “buying spree” of Western technology in the mid-1970s and again in the mid-1980s. As one assessment from 1988 notes:

Much of the technology and equipment P’yongyang wants is proscribed from export to North Korea; this makes clandestine acquisition, supplemented by dual-use purchases that can be modified to meet military requirements, a key element of the North’s effort.

P’yongyang has focused much of its technology acquisition operations in Japan and Western Europe, where ethnic Korean communities or willing collaborators have helped in the past.

The assessment also noted the importance of Singapore, Hong Kong and Macau as sources of microelectronics and computers.

Box 1: The Value of Supply-Side Controls

“Supply-side controls” is a broad term used to denote the range of tools used to prevent the supply of technology to WMD proliferators (as opposed to demand-side measures that might address the reasons that states want WMD). These include export controls and technology-based sanctions, border and customs checks, actions against procurement networks, efforts to protect dual-use training and research from being exploited by proliferators, and counter-proliferation-financing measures.

Given that North Korea has achieved a nuclear weapons and ICBM capability, what is the value of continuing to implement supply-side controls to try to prevent North Korea’s procurement of WMD-related technologies? While the true impacts of supply-side controls are difficult to gauge, there are several arguments for their continued application.

Long-Term WMD Dependencies

North Korea will continue to rely, in the short to medium term, on imported technologies and its procurement networks as its arsenal develops. Indeed, more mature nuclear and missile programmes – for example those of Russia, which has been a nuclear weapons state for 75 years – are known to still rely on imported technologies decades after crossing the nuclear threshold.

Battlefield Use and Exports

Recent North Korean sales of missiles to Russia have seen their use against civilian populations in Ukraine. While supply-side controls are unlikely to prevent further transfers across the North Korea–Russia border, preventing the transfer of technologies, particularly of Western-manufactured micro-electronics, to North Korea could help to disrupt the production of missiles in North Korea for Vladimir Putin’s war machine. The ongoing resurgence of North Korea’s arms exports enterprise provides further rationale for continued supply-side controls.

Slowing Production and Increasing Costs

If supply chains are disrupted by supply-side measures, it will be more difficult for North Korea’s procurement agents to obtain the components and materials they need. This could slow production and potentially increase the costs of procurement, as agents pay above market rate to compete with legitimate buyers.

Providing Intelligence

Export licence applications completed by exporters can provide governments with valuable intelligence about the needs of North Korea’s WMD programmes and its procurement networks, in particular intermediaries, transhipment points and shipping routes. Exporters are required to provide details of technologies, entities and stated end-uses, which can provide useful insights.

Exploiting Existing Tools

The main states capable of supplying technology – members of key multilateral export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) – already have export control systems and border controls in place. However, in some of these supplier states, for example China, export control implementation and enforcement are far from perfect. This, and the existence of a wide range of third-country hubs that proliferators can exploit, makes for large and significant loopholes in global supply-side controls. Nevertheless, great effort has been expended on developing these control systems, and the benefits of their continued use to counter North Korean procurement are clear.

Historical Nuclear Programme Procurement

In its pursuit of nuclear weapons, North Korea developed reactor and reprocessing technologies and also, as recognised later by the international community, uranium enrichment technology. While the plutonium side of the programme benefited from the construction of reactors and reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, less is known about the uranium enrichment side, with one large facility at Yongbyon revealed to foreign visitors in 2010. There are likely other facilities of unclear size and capability in other locations.

Both sides of the fuel cycle have been developed with extensive use of imported technologies. The Yongbyon reactor itself was based on a simple and ageing design, likely requiring little imported technology. But other elements of the plutonium programme required technological support and, at the time, the Soviet Union, China and other communist states were seemingly unwilling to provide it. As a result, North Korea turned to the international marketplace.

Soon after US intelligence identified in the early 1980s that North Korea was constructing a reactor, attempts by a North Korean entity to procure a wide range of technologies from West German companies were detected by the US government. The list included: 50 manipulators used to handle radioactive materials; remote control equipment; hot cells; shielding walls; ventilation and filter systems; glove boxes; and facilities for the manufacture, distribution, packaging and transport of radionuclides. As a November 1984 West German government paper noted: “In particular the last few items in the list … give rise to concern, as they seem to indicate North Korean plans to construct a (possibly unsafeguarded) reprocessing plant”. This led the US and the UK to consult with partners on efforts to prevent North Korean procurement.

North Korea also sought other technology from a West German company in the 1980s, including a small furnace in 1987, possibly through East Germany. Technicians and an official from the same company visited North Korea in 1989 and 1990. Further evidence of dual-use material and equipment procurement from West German and Swiss household name companies came to light in the 1980s.

From 1986, a North Korean diplomat, Yun Ho-Jin, was based at the North Korean mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Building a network of contacts, Yun organised trade delegation visits to Europe, some of which resulted in purchases that ended up in Yongbyon. After North Korea withdrew from the IAEA in 1994, Yun took his networks and expertise “private”, establishing the Beijing-based Namchongang Trading Corporation (NCG), which would be added to the UN North Korea sanctions list in 2009 for its proliferation activities.

Yun was far from the only diplomat active in procurement in Europe. Kim Jong Ryul, a procurement agent for the regime with a diplomatic passport, recalls procuring US-manufactured, NSG-controlled mass spectrometers in the 1990s, of use in “identifying uranium and plutonium particles”, using European front companies. North Korea also made use of other overseas connections. During the 1980s, the country turned to Korean residents in Japan through the Chongryon, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, a kind of de facto embassy, to provide scientific support and dual-use goods from the Japanese market.

North Korea’s centrifuge efforts became apparent much later, but in hindsight drew heavily on external support. Pakistan and the black-market network, run by Pakistani nuclear scientist A Q Khan, would provide North Korea with centrifuge design information. North Korea and Pakistan initially exchanged technology and knowledge in the 1990s. Later, around 2000, Khan’s network provided North Korea with about two dozen P-1 and P-2 centrifuges and measuring equipment, as well as allowing access to Pakistan’s centrifuge workshops at Khan Research Laboratories.

Between 1999 and 2003, Japanese authorities sought to prevent the export of frequency converters to North Korea – items of use in controlling centrifuges. In the early 2000s, North Korea attempted to procure extensive quantities of aluminium tubes for centrifuge construction. Yun Ho-Jin, the director of NCG, would be implicated in one unsuccessful – and possibly one successful – effort to import tubes for several thousand centrifuges. In 2002, the CIA noted that in the previous year, North Korea “began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities”.

According to the UN sanctions listing, NCG was also involved in procurement for North Korea’s plutonium-related activities, procuring Japanese-origin vacuum pumps, likely of use in the fuel fabrication facility at Yongbyon. According to reporting, NCG had allegedly been procuring “gas masks, electric timers, steel pipes, vacuum pumps, transformers and aluminum tubes” from European markets in the early 2000s using the Beijing office, and that these procurements, some of which were destined for the Syrian Al-Kibar nuclear reactor project, had alerted the US to North Korea–Syria nuclear collaboration.

Historical Missile Programme Procurement

North Korea’s missile programme has also relied on external sources of technology from both states and the international marketplace, although recent developments in the longer-range programmes have resulted in systems unique to North Korea. The programmes began with short-range Soviet Scud systems obtained from Egypt, which were reverse engineered and scaled up to create the Nodong ballistic missile. North Korea allegedly benefited from human capital leaking from the collapsed Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and Soviet design influences were seen in the failed Musudan IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile).

Much of the external technology that has supported North Korea’s missile programme has come from the international marketplace. As with the nuclear programme, North Korea likely imported a range of missile and dual-use technologies from the early days of its indigenisation efforts. This included speciality steel from the Soviet Union and later Russia, and commercially produced power systems for the transporter erector launchers (TELs) carrying missiles from Japan.

Hong Kong and Macau formed a key node in North Korea’s procurement networks from the 1980s. As a document from the UK National Archives notes, in 1993 the Hong Kong authorities raided the premises of a company with “extensive North Korean links”, which was:

the subject of numerous intelligence reports indicating its involvement in procuring strategic items on behalf of North Korea. The items are imported to Hong Kong and then exported to Macau for onward transmission to North Korea … using hand couriers.

The following year the company admitted the export of thousands of integrated circuits and components to North Korea.

North Korea has also sought trucks on which to carry its missiles, especially larger systems. In the early 1990s North Korea allegedly imported 30 Italian trucks carrying Austrian lifting equipment to produce TELs for its Nodong missiles. Around the same time, North Korea imported truck chassis from Germany for use in TEL production. Dependence on external sources for large truck chassis seems to have persisted into the UN sanctions era, when in 2012 six large eight-axle TELs were exhibited during a Pyongyang parade carrying an early ICBM design. The trucks had been procured from China in 2011, with the end use purported to be the lumber industry.

North Korea has also procured machine tools – manufacturing technologies with civil, military, missile and nuclear applications. The public record shows the role of entities in Taiwan in supplying machine tools since the 1990s. The network persisted into the UN sanctions era, when a Taiwanese businessman was indicted by a domestic court for the re-export of three types of US-origin machine tools to North Korea. In 2013, the Taiwanese businessman and his US-based son were arrested by the US authorities, with the son accused of establishing a US-based company to facilitate exports of hundreds of thousands of dollars of machine tools to his father for re-export to North Korea.

More recently, around the time of North Korea’s first successful ICBM test in 2017, debate raged over the genesis of North Korea’s achievements. Some experts alleged that North Korea likely relied on rocket engines imported from Russia or Ukraine, or even on a Russian design, although no clear evidence was presented to support shipments of goods from either country. Doubts about the domestic origins of North Korea’s more recent ICBM designs have also been largely unfounded. North Korea’s recent success in its missile efforts appears to have been largely achieved with domestic designs and expertise honed over decades and built on external expertise and imported technology.

II.Technology and UN Sanctions

Since the 1980s, North Korea has sought to obtain a wide range of different types of technology for its weapons programmes – complete systems, constituent parts, materials and components, expertise, and sensitive information. This chapter digs deeper into the types of technology and the UN sanctions seeking to prohibit their transfer. It provides a loose typology of the technology; addresses the question of the role of North Korea’s technology imports, as opposed to domestic production and indigenisation; and explores key concepts, including “dual-use” and intangible technologies, in more detail.

A Loose Typology

As demonstrated in Chapter I, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes have been built on imported technology. This is just part of North Korea’s procurement picture: imports of technology and illicit procurement networks have had a much wider application for North Korea’s strategic, defence and other development (see Box 2). They have allowed a country that long had a limited domestic industrial base to develop relatively advanced capabilities.

Box 2: Chemical, Biological and Conventional Weapons and Other Commodities

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes may be its most impactful and well-recognised procurement area, but the country’s illicit networks seek a much wider range of prohibited goods that benefit a range of strategic efforts.

Chemical Weapons

North Korea has an active chemical weapons programme, as demonstrated by the assassination in 2017 by North Korea of Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong-Nam, with the VX nerve agent. North Korea has relied on imported precursor chemicals (chemicals used to produce chemical weapons) for its programmes in the past.

Biological Weapons

North Korea is believed to have an active biological weapons programme. Analysis of images from a 2015 visit to a fertiliser factory suggested that the facility could produce bioweapons, and that modern equipment seen in the facility suggested an “active large-scale sanctions busting effort to illicitly procure the equipment” for the programme.

Military Technologies

North Korea has sought to illicitly procure military technologies, in breach of the UN arms embargo in place since 2006. Many dual-use materials used in WMD programmes will also have utility in military production. A 2013 interdicted shipment of arms from Cuba to North Korea also demonstrates North Korea’s interest in procuring spare parts for existing weapons systems.

Other Commodities

North Korea also illicitly procures a range of other goods prohibited by UN sanctions – from oil to run its economy and military, to luxury goods to maintain the regime.

Table 1 summarises the broad types of technology that North Korea has sought. These include technologies with direct and specialised applications in the nuclear and missile programmes. They include goods controlled by the NSG and the MTCR in their respective control lists: the NSG’s Part I “trigger list”; and the MTCR’s Annex Category I. Technologies sought include tangible materials, goods and components, as well as related intangibles – design information, sensitive data and knowledge relating to these items.

▲ Table 1: Broad Types of Nuclear and Missile Technologies Sought by North Korea

Dual-use technologies, those listed in the NSG guidelines’ Part II “dual-use list” and the MTCR Annex’s Category II list, also underpin North Korea’s programmes. In simple terms, dual-use technology describes those materials, goods, components and related intangibles that have both military and civilian applications. This loose category includes a wide range of technologies, everything from advanced materials and components to manufacturing capabilities. For example, alloys used in producing centrifuges could be used in the manufacture of civilian airliners, and carbon fibre used in centrifuges and missiles could have applications in high-end racing cars and yachts or even golf clubs. Machine tools used to machine centrifuge or missile components could be used in a wide range of high-end manufacturing applications. Many of the technologies used in centrifuge and missile plants – for example programmable logic controllers to control industrial processes, pumps, valves, pipes and hoses to facilitate the movement of liquids and operate centrifuges under vacuum – have applications in a wide range of other manufacturing facilities. Not all dual-use technology with applications in a WMD programme will be listed by the NSG and the MTCR, with items falling below the control thresholds still of utility to WMD programmes.

Evolving Technological Needs

What parts of this broad nuclear and missile technological picture is North Korea currently seeking outside its borders? There is very limited evidence of North Korea’s procurement activity, especially in the nuclear area, which is a challenge for judging continued dependence. Nuclear and missile technology experts interviewed for this paper suggested there is likely a declining range of areas where North Korea is truly dependent on external sources of technology. North Korea is likely capable of producing most of the nuclear-specific goods it needs domestically after more than 40 years of effort, and this is probably also true for missile-specific technologies. Many of these most sensitive technologies are more challenging to obtain from the international marketplace and therefore have likely been priorities for North Korea’s indigenisation efforts.

Despite this, North Korea’s programmes are still far from self-sufficient, with the country looking externally for a range of technologies, including many dual-use goods. With such a wide range of dual-use technologies required for these programmes, North Korea would expend significant effort to try and produce all of them domestically. These dual-use technologies are also readily available from a wider range of international manufacturers than they were a decade ago. The present-day Chinese market is likely able to provide most, if not all, of the dual-use technologies required.

However, interest in certain types of goods from certain manufacturers or other countries for quality or prestige reasons might see procurement operatives target technology from the US, Europe and Japan, for example. Much of the evidence discussed in Chapter III supports this hypothesis. Many of the tangible technologies for which there is evidence of North Korea’s pursuit in recent years have been dual use. In terms of the missile programme, an expert interviewed remarked that Western goods “are not make or break for the programme”. There are, obviously, areas where procurement of very specialised goods or intangibles may be necessary or helpful, particularly in areas of more exotic and “emerging” technologies where North Korea has less experience, as discussed below.

The above analysis therefore calls into question the utility of the term “chokepoints”, often used to refer to areas where proliferators are dependent on foreign sources of technology and can be squeezed by export controls. As one expert interviewee noted, the term is “problematic”, especially when used in relation to proliferators that have been seeking technology for decades and, recently, in an era when the global manufacturing base for dual-use technologies has grown. With dual-use technologies more readily available, states such as North Korea are more likely to be able to procure such technologies from states with weak export control implementation and enforcement, as well as from entities that are willing to sell to proliferators, or ignore red flags.

There are several transfer vectors relating to the intangibles of design information, sensitive data and knowledge. These include espionage, entering into technology transfer agreements, attending technical exchanges, training workshops or conferences, and engaging in research collaboration with entities overseas. More recent procurement of intangibles has likely taken the form of engaging in research collaborations, stealing information and data through hacks, and downloading open source research papers, as well as building domestic expertise through hands-on testing and refinement. Efforts to attract the expertise of external scientists and engineers, as occurred in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, are less prominent in North Korea’s current efforts to access nuclear- and missile-related knowledge.

UN Sanctions and Illicit Procurement

Many of the nuclear, missile and dual-use technologies that North Korea is seeking are covered by the UN North Korea sanctions regime, which prohibits the transfer of goods to, and technical collaboration with, North Korea. The regime, imposed by the UN Security Council through its Chapter VII powers, is legally binding on all UN member states. The first UNSCR in 2006 (UNSCR 1695) required all states to “exercise vigilance and prevent” the transfer of missile and WMD technology to North Korea. A further resolution the same year (UNSCR 1718) was more specific, declaring that all member states “shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories” of nuclear and missile technology, and linking to the list of technologies in the 2006 version of the NSG guidelines and the MTCR’s “Equipment, Software and Technology Annex”.

The lists associated with these technologies have been updated periodically as the NSG and MTCR lists are updated annually. Resolutions in 2013 (UNSCR 2094) and 2016 (UNSCR 2321) provided annexes that included further goods to which the existing prohibitions would apply. The technology lists were last updated by the Sanctions Committee in 2017.

Since 2006 (UNSCR 1718) there has also been a “catch-all” provision on the transfer of any technology that could contribute to North Korea’s WMD programmes. The Committee also notes that:

All Member States are further required to implement a binding dual-use “catch-all” provision to apply the above measures on any item if the State determines that it could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, other weapons of mass destruction programmes or other activities prohibited by the resolutions.

Beyond prohibitions on the transfer of controlled technology that should be implemented through UN members’ national systems for implementing export controls and sanctions, there are also various provisions for inspecting cargoes. Earlier UN Security Council resolutions “called upon” states to inspect cargo to and from North Korea, particularly if they had “information that provides reasonable grounds [for] believ[ing]” that the cargo contained prohibited items, including nuclear or missile technologies.

The resolutions also include prohibitions on activities that might allow North Korea to obtain intangibles relevant to WMD development. For example, as early as 2006 (UNSCR 1718), the sanctions decided that all UN members “shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK … of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use” of the nuclear, missile or military items prohibited for transfer to North Korea. Three years later, UNSCR 1874 called upon UN members to “exercise vigilance and prevent specialised teaching or training of North Korea nationals within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which could contribute to North Korea’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems”.

Resolutions in 2016 further tightened restrictions. UNSCR 2270 required that “all Member States shall prevent specialised teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities”. UNSCR 2321 in 2016 provided more detail on the ban on training, and also decided that all UN members should “suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges”. UNSCR 2375 in 2017 also decided that states should prohibit joint ventures with North Korea entities, which could potentially involve collaboration on technology with overseas partners.

The sanctions regime was monitored by the UNSCR 1718 Committee PoE, which was set up in 2009 and conducted investigations into various breaches and potential breaches of UN sanctions over the next 15 years. Through more than 20 mid-term and final reports, the PoE put significant information about North Korea’s illicit procurement into the public domain. The PoE was disbanded at the end of April 2024 following Russia’s veto of and China’s abstention on a resolution to extend its mandate to April 2025. The dissolution of the PoE significantly reduces scrutiny of the implementation of the UN sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, including those relating to technology transfer. Sanctions effectively remain in place, but unmonitored.

III. Procurement Evidence: Activity and Needs Since 2017

Despite the closure of many international borders between 2020 and 2023 due to the Covid-19 pandemic, North Korea has continued to procure controlled technology for its nuclear and missile programmes. As a UN PoE report noted in 2021, “foreign representatives of trading companies … including Korean Mining and Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and Saengpil Associated Corporation, who have been stuck overseas during the pandemic, have continued to import and export munitions materials to earn foreign currency and to assist with the development of weapons”. Indeed, the US government designated seven North Korean procurement agents, based in China and Russia, during the pandemic years, along with a range of other operatives involved in cybercrime, arms sales and other revenue-raising activity.

With the reopening of North Korea’s borders, and short-range missile transfers to Russia in the latter half of 2023, North Korea’s procurement networks are likely working at full speed to compensate for difficult business environments during the pandemic, and probably also to fulfil increased production for Russia’s orders, on top of meeting domestic needs. This chapter considers North Korea’s current procurement needs, focusing on evidence, largely from the past five years, of North Korean procurement activity and related concerns.

Nuclear Procurement: Secretive but Ongoing

Little is publicly known about North Korea’s nuclear procurement efforts, particularly in recent years, due to the secrecy surrounding its nuclear programme and the limited number of seizures of nuclear-related goods. There is some limited evidence on the public record that goods of use in nuclear applications have been procured in recent years, some as recently as 2021. However, these were goods with both nuclear- and missile-related uses and were procured by networks that allegedly benefited entities linked to the ballistic missile programme, discussed below.

Perhaps the most recent publicly known example of nuclear procurement involved vacuum equipment, between 2013 and 2016. A North Korean national, Kang Mun Kil, working on behalf of NCG-related entities, was involved in the procurement of pressure transducers – used to regulate pressure in centrifuge-enrichment facilities – from a Chinese company in 2013 and 2016. Kang also likely used a Hong Kong-based company for nuclear-related procurement until it was dissolved in 2017. Besides information about these purchases, little is publicly known about where the technology for North Korea’s centrifuge programme originated.

It is believed that North Korea manufactures the centrifuges domestically, for which it requires imported advanced machine tools. State media visits to factories have shown that North Korea possessed many of the machines required to produce centrifuge parts a decade ago. As R Scott Kemp noted in 2013, “it appears that North Korea is, at a minimum, well on its way to freeing the centrifuge program from dependence on foreign supplies and technology”. These machine tools are mostly imports, with the public record showing North Korea’s efforts to procure tools from the US, Europe, Japan and elsewhere.

A 2020 list of “chokepoint” items put together by the UN PoE, detailing “items for its nuclear program which North Korea could seek to procure overseas”, included a range of centrifuge-related technologies. Among these were technologies for centrifuge manufacture (autoclaves, computer numerical control machine tools and high-strength materials) from composite materials (basalt fibre, carbon fibre, filament winding machines, glass fibre, para-aramid fibre) and metals (flow-forming machines, maraging steel); centrifuge facility pipework (bellows-sealed valves); vacuum systems (pressure gauges, pressure transducers, vacuum pumps) and control systems (inverters); and tools for isotopic analysis (mass spectrometers).

North Korea has also been seeking goods for its fuel cycle assets used in the production of plutonium. In December 2023, the country first operated its experimental light water reactor, which had been under construction since 2010. Procurement for this project, as well as for the existing 5 MW and IRT-2000 reactors and reprocessing facilities, is likely to be ongoing. An unnamed UN member state expressed concern that at the end of 2018, North Korea had been looking to procure several dual-use nuclear items. These included: lithium hydroxide, “added to reactor coolants and functions to curb metal corrosion of nuclear reactor cooling pipes in military use”; high-purity graphite, used as a reactor moderator; and Austenitic stainless steel, a material used in nuclear reactors (and also with missile-related applications).

Moreover, the UN PoE’s 2020 nuclear chokepoint list included technologies related to the plutonium side of the fuel cycle. These included technologies related to reactors (pressure vessels) and reactor fuel (zirconium for fuel cladding), as well as reactor moderators (deuterium, heavy water), materials for neutron absorption (boron powder, boron-10, graphite), and equipment for handling plutonium and other isotopes (manipulators, radiation shielding windows), as well as neutron detectors that are used in reactors and elsewhere where there are criticality-related safety concerns.

Beyond procurement for fissile material production, the PoE has suggested that North Korea continues to procure weaponisation-related technologies. Some of these were included in the 2020 nuclear chokepoint list, including those for preparation of fissile material cores (controlled atmosphere furnaces, isostatic presses), components for a nuclear device (beryllium, capacitors, triggered spark gaps) and nuclear testing instruments (flash X-ray equipment, high-speed cameras). While limited cases have been seen in the public domain, analysis by the PoE suggests that North Korea’s nuclear procurement needs remain wide ranging.

Missile Procurement: Persistent and More Prominent

There is more publicly available information about North Korea’s recent ballistic missile procurement, likely in part due to the high levels of concern surrounding recent ICBM testing and the efforts of the US and allies to counter related procurement networks. Indeed, the most recent details about North Korea’s reliance on Western components have come from analysis of the wreckage of short-range missiles fired by Russia at targets in Ukraine.

Research published by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) in February 2024 showcased 290 imported components including 50 unique component types in the wreckage of a single missile, likely a KN-23 or KN-24, recovered from Ukraine. These components provide insights into North Korea’s procurement needs for electronics. According to CAR, the components were procured from 26 companies based in eight jurisdictions: China; Germany; Japan; the Netherlands; Singapore; Switzerland; Taiwan; and the US. CAR noted that more than 75% of the components originated in the US, and more than 75% that could be dated were produced between 2021 and 2023.

North Korea’s reliance on imported electronic components for its missiles is well known, seen in analysed wreckage from the Unha-3 rocket launches of 2012 and 2016. That the wreckage from 2024 contained more than 150 components procured in the past two calendar years shows how active North Korea’s procurement networks continue to be. Recent press reports, however, suggest that at least some of the electronic components that appeared to be from European and Japanese sources were counterfeit.

Other procurement efforts, from as recently as 2023, also suggest North Korea’s reliance on imported materials and components. A 2024 PoE report suggests that in 2023, North Korean procurement operative Choe Chol Min (see Box 4) was “among other activities … involved in attempts to buy inertial measurement units”, likely of use in missile guidance systems. Choe’s wife, Choe Un Jong, was also said by US authorities in 2023 to be purchasing dual-use bearings of use in missile production. The report further noted that in 2023, North Korean procurement operatives “sought to import multiple tons of AlMg6, an aluminium-magnesium alloy, as well as stainless steel sheets”.

Showcasing the quantities of materials imported, at least four orders were also placed in early 2021, overseen by North Korean national Kim Jong Dok. These included “1Cr18Ni9Ti stainless steel, a special alloy used in missile applications”, with orders totalling more than 80,000 kg, as well as “other missile related technologies, including valves, pumps and ball bearings” and a total of 149,000 kg of other types of steel. A leaked US State Department cable detailing a démarche to China in 2008 notes that 1Cr18Ni9Ti stainless steel was previously used “in a variety of structural parts in Scud B and C missiles”, and the material may have similar uses in more modern North Korean systems.

In 2019 and 2020, Rim Ryong Nam, a North Korean procurement operative based in Shenyang, China, allegedly shipped several tons of aluminium powder, a material of use in solid missile fuel production, to North Korea “on multiple occasions”. A 2020 PoE report noted that North Korea likely needs around 10 tons of aluminium powder annually to support its programme. In early 2018, Rim Ryong Nam was also known to be seeking aluminium powder, as well as other commodities of use in solid-propelled rocket manufacture, including: MAPO, a chemical of use in bonding solid propellant; industrial-use argon; electrolytic copper; metallic chrome; acetone and steel plates.

Beyond the evidence relating to specific efforts to procure goods, the PoE, the US and an unnamed UN member state have provided information about the types of missile-related goods and materials that North Korea has been trying to source in recent years. Most recently, a 2024 PoE report included a schematic of 60 types of “critical items needed” by North Korea for its ballistic missile programme, noting that 23 of these constituted an “identified target of North Korea international procurement between 2018 and 2023”. While the report highlighted the extensive procurement efforts, it also noted that North Korea had “increased its self-sufficiency” in the manufacture of equipment and components for missile production. This included areas related to manufacturing casings and other complex metal parts, airframes and TELs. The report, drawing on UN member state information, also suggested that North Korea continued to be dependent on imports of “specialty steels and aluminium” and higher-grade carbon fibre, although lower-grade materials would suffice for many requirements in the programme.

A 2020 US government North Korea Ballistic Missile Procurement Advisory, central to recent US outreach on North Korea procurement, listed eight categories and almost 30 different types of technologies, with a special emphasis on alloys. The information in the Advisory appears to have formed the basis of a 2020 briefing delivered to the PoE which provided more details about North Korea’s capabilities, including chokepoints in production. The construction of extra-large TELs appeared to be something that North Korea had struggled with “for reasons of cost and technology”. In terms of metals, North Korea had “had difficulty” producing the “quantity and quality” of speciality steels and aluminium. With regard to chemicals used in solid propellent motors, the member state noted that “although the DPRK had manufacturing capacity”, its plant “might not be operating well”, with North Korean engineers having difficulty “producing such materials at the right degree of purity and particulate size”.

There were similar statements about North Korea’s procurement needs in previous years. Information passed to the PoE by a member state, and published in 2019, indicated that North Korea was procuring goods for processing missile-related chemicals. This included digital indicating controllers, lithium carbonate, sodium fluoride, epichlorohydrin and activated charcoal. A member state also noted that at the end of 2018, North Korea was looking to and may have succeeded in procuring MAPO, “Martensitic stainless steel”, of use in rocket engine parts, and “Austenitic stainless steel”.

Intangible Technologies: By Any Means

Beyond tangible goods, North Korea has also widely sought related intangible technologies. As Philip Baxter and others have noted, North Korea has “pursued a multi-prong strategy to acquire nuclear intangible technology”, adapting its scientific collaborations around sanctions and “coalesc[ing] a cluster of individual researchers and research institutions that are interconnected with each other and with foreign researchers and institutions”. Beyond its international collaborations, North Korea has pursued and likely will continue to pursue, in a more constrained environment, educational and training opportunities overseas, and conduct hacks of technology-holding entities.

Following the 2016 UN ban on scientific and technical cooperation, a 2017 investigation noted that China was home to the “bulk” of North Korean scientists abroad, quoting official Chinese education ministry statistics indicating that 1,086 North Koreans were studying at postgraduate level in China in 2015. The same investigation noted one North Korean scientist studying topics at PhD level related to missile development at one of China’s elite aerospace universities (see Box 3). North Korean students at this institution also downloaded 57,000 research papers on a single day in 2017. A further 2018 study identified 100 published journal articles jointly authored by North Korean and external scientists in areas with significance for WMD and dual-use technologies. This included articles on space- and missile-related technologies, precision machine tools, optical tracking and GPS technology, all authored with Chinese colleagues in 2016 and 2017.

Box 3: Spy-Scientists: North Koreans on Chinese Campuses

An investigation in 2017 by The Wall Street Journal highlighted the role of North Korea’s scientists studying in China, and particularly the role of one individual, a scientist named Kim Kyong Sol, who was based at China’s elite Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT). The institute ranked highly in areas such as aerospace engineering, mechanical engineering, automation and control, and metallurgical engineering. Kim’s area of study was “mechatronics—a blend of mechanical engineering, electronics and programming”.

Kim’s work concerned “MR damping”, a technology used in stabilising spacecraft and absorbing shock in missile-launch systems, including in submarine platforms. He published some results from his research in 2016 with Chinese colleagues, listing his affiliation as “Department of Mechanical Engineering, Kim Chaek University of Technology, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. He also published an article in 2017 co-authored with a senior engineer in the Chinese space programme. In 2021 Kim published an article on a similar topic in a North Korean journal.

Footnotes in the 2016 paper Kim co-authored show the research was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, a research foundation directly linked to the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. The funding related to hypersonic vehicles. HIT signed an agreement on cooperation with Kim Il Sung University in 2011.

In 2013, North Korea sent the first group of 12 doctoral and post-doctoral students to enrol at HIT, with 28 working there by 2015. Kim, and at least 11 other North Koreans, left HIT in summer 2017, with others switching to subjects not covered by sanctions, such as management. According to university staff interviewed by The Wall Street Journal, “The North Koreans all had Chinese government scholarships, they said, which provided free housing and tuition and monthly stipends of about 3,000 yuan ($450)”.

North Korean operatives have also hacked foreign companies, including the systems of NPO Mashinostroyeniya, a Russian missile and space company that produces ICBMs, hypersonic missiles and satellites. This intrusion began in late 2021 and continued until the company uncovered it in May 2022, allowing the hackers “the ability to read email traffic, jump between networks, and extract data”. Beyond hypersonic technology (the company produces the Russian 3M22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missile), North Korea could have been interested in other technologies developed by the company, for example, ampulisation technology, where liquid-fuelled missiles are fuelled and sealed in the factory, allowing higher combat readiness for extended periods. More broadly, Microsoft noted in a 2023 report that the “North Korean government is assigning multiple cyber groups to meet high-priority collection requirements to improve the country’s military capabilities”.

IV. Procurement Entities: Organisations and Operatives

With such wide-ranging procurement needs, North Korea relies on a diverse network of procurement operatives based in a range of countries, but mostly focused on China and Russia. This chapter considers the organisations, the types of actors working on their behalf, the industry targets these networks seek to exploit, and the procurement intermediaries. Case studies are used to provide further details on the types of actors that coordinate and make up these supply chains.

Organisations and Front Companies

There are many entities involved in North Korea’s illicit procurement operations for nuclear- and missile-related goods, as well as for broader military, chemical and biological warfare, luxury goods and other commodities. North Korea’s sanctions-busting networks are near to global in scope, and their procurement aspects represent a narrower sub-section, based in and around economies with advanced technologies. The entities for which there is open source information likely represent the tip of the iceberg, and also may already be inactive. As a member state has noted: “In order to circumvent sanctions, North Korea changes its import/export-related organisation structures every eight months”.

Given these constraints, Figures 1–3 offer an overview of North Korea’s WMD-related procurement apparatus, showing selected parent entities, state trading companies and front companies. There are likely other front companies and operations that are not detailed in open sources and may even be unknown to interested intelligence agencies.

North Korea’s nuclear- and missile-related procurement infrastructure is spread across several government entities that run front companies which both raise revenue and purchase goods. Of these, least is known about nuclear-related procurement, undertaken by entities such as NCG, falling under the control of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE), or the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry (MAEI), as it appears to have been named since 2013. The UN describes both the GBAE and the MAEI as having oversight of the operation of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center.

Procurement for the ballistic missile programme is largely undertaken by entities which fall under the Munitions Industries Department (MID), “responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles”. Under MID is the Academy of National Defense Science (ANDS, previously the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, SANS), which UN sanctions lists note is “involved in the DPRK’s efforts to advance the development of its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs”. Information provided by an anonymous UN member state notes that ANDS has a “procurement office” that oversees the front companies and procurement agents.

Also falling under MID is the Second Economic Committee, which, the UN has noted, is “responsible for overseeing the production of the DPRK’s ballistic missiles, and directs the activities of KOMID”. MID may also oversee some procurement for the nuclear weapons programme, because it includes the Nuclear Weapons Institute. A third entity, the Ministry of Rocket Industry (MORI), was sanctioned by the US in 2022 and noted to be “owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the MID”. The US State Department has noted that MORI “works with DPRK overseas representatives from other DPRK organisations to support Ministry of Rocket Industry procurement goals”.

Procurement is also undertaken by entities connected to the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces and the Korean People’s Army. The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), “DPRK’s premiere intelligence organization”, oversees the arms trading company Green Pine Associated, which has been involved in procurement. The RGB also has been connected to cyber actors such as the Lazarus Group, which in a high-profile case in 2023 hacked a Russian missile manufacturer for sensitive data.

▲ Figure 1: Selected Nuclear Procurement Apparatus

▲ Figure 2: Selected Procurement Apparatus Subordinate to MID

▲ Figure 3: Selected Procurement Apparatus Subordinate to MPAF and Unknown

Notes applying to above Figures 1–3:

Lines suggest subordination and loose control, rather than necessarily being indicative of supplier relationship.

The figures do not include entities for which there is no evidence of a WMD-related procurement role, even if they are known front companies involved in arms trading or other related activities. Information on entities’ role in procurement can be found in RUSI’s “DPRK Reports Database”, which uses information from the PoE reports and details involvement in illicit WMD-related procurement.

The following entities are either not listed in the database or are listed without information about procurement: Korea Kumsan Trading Corporation; Tosong Technology Trading Company; New East International Trading; Ryonbong General Corporation; Korea Kwangsong Trading Corporation; Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation; Korea Ryonhap Trading Corporation; Korea Ryungsong Trading Company; and Green Pine Associated Corporation. Evidence of the procurement role of these entities (rather than of arms sales, some of which pre-dates the first PoE report in 2010, and even UN sanctions in 2006) has been drawn from US designations, leaked US State Department cables and media articles. The US Treasury suggests that at least one of the four trading companies subordinate to MORI has imported “large equipment manufactured by a European company to North Korea”, without specifying which (all four are included in the figure). See US Treasury, “Treasury Targets Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Weapons of Mass Destruction Organization and Subsidiaries”.

The opaque nature of these networks means that it is unclear to which parent entity some of the front companies are subordinate. The front companies likely change frequently to avoid scrutiny. Procurement is known to not have been undertaken by some of the entities in Figures 1–3 (at least according to what can be gleaned from open sources) for a decade or longer. Demonstrating North Korea’s flexibility in managing overseas business affairs, there are also cases (including those detailed below) where individuals working for another part of North Korea’s government, for example as diplomats for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also work on behalf of these procurement entities.

Network Actors: Broker, Diplomat, Scientist, Spy

North Korean operatives work for these entities overseas. There may be tens or even more than 100 of these individuals operating at any one time, although, as a UN member state noted in 2019: “The number of DPRK procurement agents overseas is decreasing and those remaining are focusing on the procurement of critical missile related components as well as dual-use and below-threshold items”. These procurement operatives likely remained overseas during the years of Covid-19 border closures, with Pyongyang only starting to rotate senior diplomats for the first time since the 2020 border closures in late 2023. This section takes a closer look at these procurement agents, as well as other diverse actors involved in technology acquisition.

▲ Figure 4: Nodes in North Korea’s WMD-Related Procurement Network (Europe, 2018–present)

▲ Figure 5: Nodes in North Korea’s WMD-Related Procurement Network (Asia, 2018–present)

Figures 4 and 5 provide a geographical overview of North Korea’s procurement networks, drawing together data from 2018 to the present. Designations over the past few years have highlighted the role of North Korea’s procurement operatives in China and Russia. For example, in 2022, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated one Russia-based and four China-based North Korean nationals for their roles in procurement representing “SANS-subordinate organisations”. These included one person in Vladivostok who had procured telecoms-related items from Russian firms, two in Dalian who had procured steel, and two in Shenyang who had procured software and chemicals. This followed the designation of 10 China-based representatives of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation in 2018. As the press release noted:

Many of these individuals are located at Ryonbong representative offices in China near the China-North Korean border, where they support the regime in a variety of ways: the Ji’an office handled large quantities of a wide variety of multi-purpose goods such as chemicals, drilling equipment, hoses, metals, and machines; the Dandong office procured multi-purpose items for North Korean arms proliferators; and the Linjiang office often was tasked to fill orders consisting of high quantities of goods worth several millions of dollars.

Other recent cases have also involved procurement operatives in China and Russia. In 2023, the US sanctioned a Beijing-based husband and wife procurement team (see Box 4). Recent PoE reports have also emphasised the role of North Koreans based in China, including Kim Jong Dok, who placed orders with another Dandong-based North Korean national, and Rim Ryong Nam, based in Shenyang (see Chapter II).

Box 4: Procurement Operatives: Keeping it in the Family

In June 2023, the US Treasury sanctioned two North Korean nationals for their involvement in the procurement of technology for North Korea’s missile programme. These individuals were Choe Chol Min, “a Beijing-based SANS representative who has worked with DPRK weapons trading officials, PRC [Chinese] nationals, and other associates” and his wife, Choe Un Jong, a Beijing-based North Korean diplomat.

Born in 1978, Choe Chol Min appears to have a background in scientific research. An individual with the same name appears to have published a series of academic papers under an affiliation at the Kim Chaek University of Technology in Pyongyang. These papers on materials and castings – if written by the same person – suggest he was well placed to understand procurement requirements and assess potential suppliers.

The US sanctions notification noted that Choe “received procurement requests from the DPRK for items and coordinated with associates to fulfill those orders”. It also identifies other activities, including collaborating with SANS representatives “to facilitate the dispatch of over a thousand DPRK workers” to China. These appear to be forced labourers, used to generate funds which are made available for the regime’s use, rather than missile technicians or scientists. The listing also notes Choe’s support to North Korea’s “primary weapons trading entity”, likely to be KOMID, in line with similar US language use, and his work with “DPRK weapons trading officials to purchase electronic equipment for Iranian customers”.

Choe Un Jong, “officially assigned” to the North Korean embassy in Beijing, allegedly supported her husband’s work, and “helped coordinate an order with one or more SANS associates for dual-use bearings that are used in DPRK ballistic missile production”.

Beyond the procurement operatives, North Korea’s diplomats have long played a role supporting the country’s nuclear and missile programmes. This was seen from the earliest days of North Korea’s procurement operations, as they sought to breach the CoCoM embargo. Chapter I describes the role of diplomats such as Yun Ho-Jin and Kim Jong Ryul in Western Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. North Korean diplomats have continued to play this procurement role, alongside their role in holding together North Korea’s broader sanctions-busting networks.

Embassies in several locations have emerged as procurement hubs for North Korea’s WMD programmes, particularly those in more developed countries with close access to advanced manufacturing technologies. In Europe, Germany and Switzerland have traditionally been a hunting ground for North Korea’s procurement operatives. In 2018, a senior German intelligence source noted that the North Korean embassy in Berlin was being used for WMD-related procurement. The North Korean embassies in Moscow and Beijing also appear to have played an important role in procurement. The embassy in Moscow has featured in two recent cases, including one involving O Yong Ho (see Box 5). The embassy in Beijing hosted Choe Un Jong, one half of the husband and wife procurement team described in Box 4.

Other types of diplomatic missions and those adjacent to states hosting WMD-related technologies have also been utilised. For example, diplomats connected to a North Korean trade delegation in Belarus were found to be targeting sensitive rocketry-related information in Ukraine around 2011. The 2018 sanctioning of 10 North Korean procurement operatives included an individual noted to be the “Vice Consul of North Korean Consulate General in Nakhodka, Russia”. A representative of North Korea’s state airline Air Koryo, based in Dandong, is also noted in a US sanctions listing to have been “involved in the transportation of electronic parts from China to the DPRK on behalf of the DPRK’s Ministry of Rocket Industry (MORI)”.

Box 5: Dodgy Diplomats: Technology from Russia with Love

O Yong Ho, a commercial counsellor in North Korea’s embassy in Moscow, is alleged to have acted as a procurement agent for ANDS in Russia. A UN member state provided information that alleged that he was “in charge of procurement of civilian production-related and consumer goods in the country” and attempted to procure a wide range of strategic commodities between 2016 and 2020.

These strategic goods included aramid fibre (brand name Kevlar – a type of composite material of use in body armour, missiles and potentially centrifuges), aramid fibre production equipment, “a spinning nozzle”, four chemicals, stainless steel used in liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles, and steels used in submarine manufacture and bearings. The largest quantity of any individual product was submarine steel – the diplomat sought to purchase 3,000 tons (worth more than $10 million). This amount of steel is significant, with the Romeo-class submarine on which North Korea’s new missile submarine is based weighing around 2,500 tons. In 2016, O allegedly brought a delegation of North Korean officials to inspect the metal. In 2017, he sought hot and cold isostatic presses, used in manufacturing nose tips for re-entry vehicles, and nozzle inserts for rocket motors.

O also allegedly sought intangibles. He obtained handwritten instructions for using a specific catalyst in solid rocket fuel from a Russian contact. He also received CAD drawings for a TRDD-50 cruise missile, a Soviet nuclear-capable system first deployed in the 1980s, from a now “allegedly deceased” Russian rocket scientist.

Beyond procurement agents and diplomats, North Korea has also relied on other North Korean nationals for procurement of intangibles – notably scientists and hackers. North Korea has long sought to benefit from scientific expertise overseas, including through trying to attract scientists to North Korea, and sending North Koreans overseas to benefit from education and training. China has been a long-time target of North Korea’s sensitive information gathering, especially in recent years, as its scientific capabilities have grown (see Box 3).

Targeted Industry

North Korean procurement operatives target a variety of types of companies that produce the technologies described in Chapter II. This ranges from those who are willing to knowingly supply North Korea to those willing to ignore the full background of those they are selling to, to those who are unwittingly targeted and exploited. The use of procurement agents outside North Korea, intermediaries in third countries (those not hosting the supplier or customer), and the use of a range of deceptive practices have historically allowed North Korea’s procurement operatives – and indeed those of other proliferating countries – to dupe industry that is trying to comply with export controls.

North Korea’s interest in Russia and China stems from the availability of technology and the prevalence of manufacturers for the goods. Recent cases have reflected this, with Kim Jong Dok placing orders through a North Korean-controlled front company with “several Chinese companies”, allegedly including firms in the cities of Zibo and Shandong. Elsewhere it was noted that he regularly placed orders with unspecified “third country based” companies – presumably those outside North Korea and China. In the case of Rim Ryong Nam, aluminium powder and chemicals were procured from another company in Shandong province.

In these contexts, some cases show that North Korean agents have built relationships with specific local companies over a longer period – indeed, this would probably be their aim, in order to create a steady supply of technologies. One Russian businessman who sold bearings to North Korea and was sanctioned by the US Treasury noted that he maintained a relationship with a North Korean diplomat based at the embassy in Moscow for several years, and was passed on to the diplomat’s successor when he returned to Pyongyang.

Both Russia and especially China, with its rapidly expanding manufacturing base, likely can provide many of the dual-use technologies required by North Korea. However, North Korea’s procurement operatives may still look elsewhere for some technologies to sustain its programmes, either because they seek particular items of the highest quality, or because of a bias in favour of items from specific manufacturers or jurisdictions such as the US, EU states or Japan. These goods may include high-end semiconductors similar to those found in the missile wreckage from Ukraine, or high-end machine tools and spare parts. Procuring from third countries such as China, an enormous and important market for normal and benign exports, likely helps to alleviate some concerns of export compliance officers based in these exporting companies.

Political will on the part of many supplier states to implement both sanctions and export control systems, and their willingness to engage industry to counter illicit procurement, mean that WMD-related procurement efforts more frequently rely on deception. To this end, WMD-related procurement operatives, including those working for North Korea, have developed a range of deception methods over time (see Box 6). Many of these are not new, having also been used by other proliferators to procure technologies in breach of embargoes – from the Soviet Union during the Cold War to Iran, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan and Syria – to supply their WMD programmes. These means of deception are also designed to make it more difficult for export control enforcement, intelligence and customs authorities to uncover illicit procurement networks.

Box 6: Means of Deception: How Does North Korea Dupe Industry?

The Goods

By carefully selecting the types of goods they are looking to procure, North Korea operatives enhance their chance of successful procurement.

• Sub-control-threshold items being procured, rather than controlled items, can result in less scrutiny. In some cases, sub-threshold items (for example, electronic components) can be used in WMD programmes, but are more likely to fail in these applications.

• Second-hand items are less likely to be viewed as sensitive and are more likely to be sold by those who do not understand the risks of illicit procurement

The Industry Targets

Certain types of industry targets will be more susceptible to North Korea’s illicit procurement and WMD-related illicit procurement more broadly, particularly those that work in ways that avoid direct contact with sellers or permit procurement without approaching the manufacturers.

• Second-hand markets are likely to be less regulated and may facilitate North Korea’s procurement operatives’ avoidance of approaching the manufacturers.

• Business-to-business websites can allow procurement agents to retain more anonymity.

• Distributors generally have a lesser understanding of the products and what they can be used for and may be less concerned about reputational risk, since their logo is not on the product.

• Naive exporters, for example those new to export or with weak domestic compliance programmes, may undertake limited due diligence.

The Methods

North Korea’s procurement operatives will commonly use several methods to deceive exporters and export controllers, often to obscure the true end user or end use.

• Third-country entities or transhipment hubs – for example, China, Russia and Hong Kong – are used to route goods and obscure the end-user.

• Multiple intermediaries are used to help to obscure the true buyer.

• Aliases and a range of different letterheads are used to get around being listed or designated.

• Falsifying end-user undertaking, making it look as if the end-user has a legitimate civil use for the products.

The Transfer

Once successfully procured, certain methods will be used to reduce the chances that shipments are interdicted on their route to North Korea.

• Mislabelling goods in documentation – “machinery” or “spare parts” are less likely to gain attention than listing specific products.

• Falsifying shipping documentation.

• Concealment of the goods, for example at the back of a shipping container, or underneath similar but uncontrolled items.

Intermediaries: Chinese Cross-Border Networks and Moving the Goods

The role of intermediaries in China has been extensive in North Korea’s procurement networks. China has long accounted for the bulk of North Korea’s international trade, and has also emerged as a significant producer of dual-use technologies in recent decades. This has made the border between China and North Korea, and specifically the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge across the Yalu River in the town of Dandong, central to North Korea’s procurement operations.

Large mixed Chinese networks illegally selling North Korean coal in China and using the proceeds to purchase general commodities such as sugar and fertiliser as well as dual-use goods – and potentially nuclear- and missile-related items – and moving them across the border have provided a lifeline for North Korea’s economy and its strategic programmes. A 2020 RUSI report noted the close-knit nature of these networks, highlighting that a small set of 150 Chinese companies accounted for around 20–25% of global exports to North Korea in 2015 and 2016. The report also noted that of these 150 companies’ shipments to North Korea, 93.4% were moved by motor vehicle.

Understanding the activities of these networks has been more challenging since shipment-level trade data for exports from China to North Korea became unavailable in 2017. However, indictment of two of the larger networks by the US in that timeframe, including that of Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd and Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material (see Box 7), provides insights into the workings of these mixed procurement networks.

Box 7: The Dealers of Dandong: The Role of Chinese Intermediaries

Large cross-border trade networks run by Chinese intermediaries have acted as procurement proxies, enabling North Korea’s designated entities to access the global financial system, and selling North Korean commodities to raise funds in China that are then used to buy much-needed commodities and WMD-related goods.

Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co. Ltd (DHID), part of a wider network overseen by Chinese national Ma Xiaohong, was indicted in 2017 for efforts to evade sanctions and allowing North Korea to access the US financial system using a dual-ledger system and many front companies. An internal company PowerPoint slide deck from 2010, published by the US Justice Department with the indictment, claimed that the company accounted for 20% of China–North Korea trade at that time. Other analysis from trade data has echoed the importance of this network, including DHID accounting for $93 million of exports to North Korea between 2014 and 2017, and $532 million of China–North Korea business between 2011 and 2015. Some of the commodities procured through the network included dual-use goods such as aluminium ingots, aluminium oxide and a tungsten compound.

Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material (also known as Dandong Chengtai Trading Co., Ltd), established in 2005, was part of a second network of companies, overseen by Dandong-based Chinese accountant Chi Yupeng. A confidential source quoted in a 2017 US complaint noted that Dandong Zhicheng imported nearly $700 million of North Korean coal between 2013 and 2017. RUSI analysis of trade data suggests that the company accounted for nearly $500 million of North Korean exports between 2014 and 2017, making it the biggest of the 150 Chinese companies analysed.

The proceeds of coal sold through Chinese intermediaries were used to purchase a range of products, including “bulk commodities (sugar, rubber, petroleum products, soybean oil), cell phones, luxury items, or dual-use technology”. A RUSI report identified several companies in Shenyang as likely purchasing front companies, which trade data indicated had exported goods such as arc welding machines and electrodes, thermostats, barometers and spherical roller bearings to North Korea between 2011 and 2017.

As noted by a defector who had first-hand knowledge of Office 39, the office generating revenue for the Kim regime’s personal finances, 95% of funds generated through coal sales are put “toward the advancement of North Korea’s military, nuclear missiles and other weapons programs”. Defector testimony summarised in the case also noted a small number of individuals were key nodes in North Korea’s networks, including Chi Yupeng, who had gained a “trusted position with, and maintained close ties to, North Korean government and North Korean military”.

The US sought civil asset forfeitures against these two networks, seeking $74 million from DHID and $4.08 million from the network surrounding Dandong Zhicheng.

While these Chinese intermediary networks move vast quantities of goods across the border, other means are also used to move more sensitive goods to North Korea. In the case of O Yong Ho (see Box 5), he planned to move goods – a large quantity of steel – by rail from Moscow to the rail terminal at the border with North Korea. The US designated representatives of state airline Air Koryo for “engaging in transportation and procurement activities”, noting that they “help the airline transport goods back to the DPRK on behalf of two UN- and U.S.-designated entities involved in intelligence activities, arms trade, and the DPRK’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs”. One of these individuals, an Air Koryo “logistics manager”, worked in Beijing to transfer goods to the RGB in Pyongyang, likely by air.

For a long time, the diverse nature of the entities involved in these networks, their geographical locus in China and Russia, and their long experience in illicit procurement activities have made these networks challenging to counter. North Korea’s declining dependency on manufacturing bases beyond China and Russia, its successes, and the changing geopolitical situation necessitate consideration of future trends that will shape North Korea’s procurement networks, which is the focus of the next chapter.

V. North Korea’s Future Procurement Networks

Recent developments, including those outside the technical developments in North Korea’s programmes, have implications for the future of North Korea’s procurement networks. This chapter considers some of the main factors that will shape the future of these networks.

Evolving Procurement Needs

North Korea’s procurement networks and the technologies they are targeting will evolve in line with the country’s technological needs. As the UN PoE noted, North Korea has been successful in indigenising the production of technologies in certain areas, which may reduce the need to import certain goods. The evolution of North Korea’s programmes will also shape needs, with two examples provided in a recent PoE report.

First, the ongoing shift towards solid-fuel systems, including the potential mass production of the new solid-fuelled ICBM for domestic use, and the short-range KN-23 type missiles for sale to Russia, will create greater requirements for the import of solid-fuel precursors, on which North Korea appears to have some dependency. North Korea’s Five-Year Plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems lists “solid fuel propulsion for submarine-launched and ground-based ICBMs” as a priority area.

Second, as North Korea seeks to create greater accuracy for its missile systems, also an objective listed in the 2021 Five-Year Plan, there may be greater demand for guidance components, including “foreign-procured high-quality gyroscopes, accelerometers, complete inertial measurement units and electronics”. Other priority areas listed in the Five-Year Plan may create new procurement requirements, including in relation to military reconnaissance satellites, R&D in hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered submarines and UAVs. This will likely create greater needs for imports in the shorter term, although North Korea’s indigenisation efforts may offset this in the longer term.

The North Korea–Russia Axis

North Korea’s recently renewed relationship with Russia may provide it with access to certain technologies for its WMD programmes, undermining the need to source them from the international marketplace. Media reports surrounding Kim Jong Un’s September 2023 visit to Russia, which included stops at a cosmodrome and a fighter jet factory, suggested that North Korea was interested in “advanced technology for satellites and nuclear-powered submarines”.

Russia could potentially supply many of the technologies that North Korea is seeking for the Five-Year Plan for the development of defence science and weapons systems it adopted in 2021. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated in September 2023 that the UN sanctions were “adopted in a completely different geopolitical situation”. Further technological transfers are likely, although these may stop short of direct support to North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, which would be highly controversial. Russia may be incentivised to provide technology to North Korea as a further means of challenging the US and partners, although North Korea’s need for other commodities, including food and fertiliser, for example, means that such sensitive technological barter is not a given.

More Specialised Targets

North Korea is likely to continue to import tangible items for ongoing production at the same time as seeking more niche and advanced tangible and intangible technologies for its development efforts to fulfil its objectives under the Five-Year Plan. The pursuit of technologies related to hypersonics, missile front-end development, satellites and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, for example, means there must be efforts to tap into a smaller pool of highly specialised targets for key technologies, particularly for intangibles.

Beyond the possibility of some technology being willingly provided by Russia, the expansion of North Korea’s cyber capabilities means that hacks to obtain sensitive information, such as the hack (linked to the Lazarus Group) of a Russian missile manufacturer, are likely to be more common. A 2023 Microsoft report noted that North Korea’s hackers had targeted national defence industries in at least 16 countries, with the five countries most frequently targeted being Russia (14% of attacks recorded), the US (10%), Israel (10%), Germany (9%) and India (7%). Some of the targets that develop very specialist information, such as universities, research organisations and tech startups, for example in the NewSpace industry (developing access to space and spaceflight technologies), may represent softer targets than government facilities and larger corporations.

Procurement for Partners

Procurement of missile- and potentially nuclear-related technologies may also be undertaken by North Korea for partners, alongside the transfer of technology from North Korea itself. North Korea has a long history of overseas missile sales for profit, as well as previously selling nuclear technologies to partners (see Box 8). The risks posed by a return to North Korean missile and potentially nuclear exports are growing. From under the security of a nuclear deterrent, with a greater range of products to offer, some of which have been visibly battlefield tested in Ukraine, a sanctions regime near to collapse and a strengthening partnership between existing customers such as Russia, Iran and Syria, North Korea could be in a good place to benefit from sales. The country’s procurement networks, therefore, may be more likely to undertake this procurement for partners in the near future, as well as to fulfil domestic needs.

Box 8: A Nuclear and Missile Supermarket? North Korea as Procurement Contractor

North Korea has long been an exporter of missile, and in a smaller number of cases, nuclear, technologies. A wide range of customers for missile technology in the 1980s and 1990s has been slimmed down to a smaller number of collaborative relationships, with countries such as Iran and Syria at the forefront. The recent transfers of missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine may lead to a broader renaissance for North Korea’s missile-exporting industry.

The most significant example of nuclear exports was the assistance that North Korea provided to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor at Al-Kibar, which was bombed by Israel in 2007. In a 2017 case, North Korea apparently marketed H-bomb isotope Lithium-6 on a Chinese business-to-business website in an open advert that could be linked through a telephone number to North Korea’s embassy in Beijing.

North Korea’s activities in these areas have involved sourcing materials, goods and components for joint projects, whether Iranian missile projects being undertaken jointly with North Korean technicians in Iran, or goods for the Al-Kibar reactor project. In this sense, North Korea provides a contracting service to its partners.

Potential Collapse of UN Sanctions

Russia’s violation of UN sanctions through arms and missile purchases from North Korea could lead to a more extensive collapse of the UN sanctions regime. The regime has been on life support for several years, with a failed attempt to secure a further sanctions resolution in May 2022, and no new entities added to the sanctions list since 2017. The 2024 demise of the PoE due to a Russian veto and Chinese abstention from a vote to extend its mandate is a further sign. Besides Russia, China has long dragged its feet on implementation and enforcement of existing sanctions, and could potentially become a more active spoiler, making life easier for North Korea’s procurement networks. If other UN members recognise that Russia is openly violating sanctions with few repercussions, this could cause other states – many in the Global South are already struggling to implement the resolutions – to ignore sanctions evasion activity on a greater scale. Given that these are not technology supplier states, this may have a limited effect on North Korea’s illicit procurement, but some of these states are well suited to act as third-country transhipment or re-export hubs, which could provide new opportunities for North Korea’s procurement networks.

Evolving Networks

The entities and geography of North Korea’s overseas networks will continue to evolve in a broader sense. The recent decision by North Korea to close around a quarter of its overseas diplomatic missions is an example. As noted above, a 2019 PoE report also noted that the number of procurement operatives overseas was declining. Given the core of North Korea’s procurement networks is already focused on Russia and China, these mission closures are more likely to affect broader sanctions-busting efforts, rather than procurement. However, some of the specific missions closing – such as the one in Hong Kong – could have an important impact on procurement operations. The genesis of the closure of so many missions is unclear, but likely reflects the declining benefits of such a network for sanctions busting, the risks posed by defections and foreign intelligence monitoring, and North Korea’s risk aversion. It also may reflect newer remote-work models of sanctions busting, for example earning revenue through IT labourers or cryptocurrency hacks.

Together these potential developments suggest that North Korea’s procurement networks will continue to shop for a wide range of technologies, and likely in a more permissive environment. If the UN sanctions regime continues to weaken, a more focused effort to prevent procurement will be required.

Conclusion

Despite successes in its nuclear and missile programmes over the past few years, North Korea still relies on external sources of technology to supply its weapons programmes. Judging by its own technology trajectory and other proliferation cases, it will continue to do so in the long term. Over the past decades, procurement networks with tentacles all around the world have been used by North Korea to obtain technology from willing exporters and naive businesses, and through duping those trying to comply with export controls. These networks will continue to be key to the sustainment of North Korea’s programmes and further technological progress.

This paper has analysed North Korea’s procurement networks, particularly in light of the successes of the country’s nuclear and missile programmes, and recent geopolitical shifts relating to Russia’s relationship with North Korea in terms of the war in Ukraine. It has drawn on underexploited source material to provide an overview of North Korea’s procurement networks, focusing on the past five years. The paper has found that North Korea’s networks have been highly active, and this is likely to continue as they seek to make up for the slowdown in procurement during the Covid-19-related border closures, and to compensate for goods used in recent Russian orders for missile technology.

North Korea’s procurement networks are largely focused on China and Russia. In these jurisdictions, North Korea’s operatives – trading company personnel, diplomats, intelligence officers, and scientists and researchers – have been able to operate with relative impunity and establish supply chains for a growing number of requisite technologies. However, there are still some requirements that see North Korea looking to manufacturers in the US, Europe, Japan and other markets to fulfil.

The changing dynamic in North Korea’s renewed relationship with Russia is perhaps the most important factor that will shape the future of North Korea’s procurement networks. If Moscow were to formally offer strategic technologies to Pyongyang, or to allow North Korea’s operatives to openly shop on a larger scale from Russian providers, this could be bountiful for North Korea’s procurement needs.

Other factors will also shape the nature of North Korea’s networks into the future, including evolving procurement needs and greater requirements for highly specialised technologies from a smaller number of niche suppliers.

Overall, the paper concludes that despite North Korea’s successes, there remains value in seeking to prevent access to, and procurement of, technology (see Box 1). Given this, the paper provides 10 recommendations for those seeking to counter North Korea’s illicit procurement, including government officials, staff at international organisations and researchers outside government.

Recommendations

1. Continue to hone export controls in the West and beyond

Export controls clearly have value, even if they do not prevent all transfers. Resurgent interest in export controls to prevent technology transfer to China and Russia could provide opportunities to identify and build on synergies, particularly given that China and Russia are the two most prominent “third countries” where North Korea’s procurement networks operate. North Korea also clearly relies on many of the same sectors to supply its programmes, including potential overlaps in challenging areas such as microelectronics.

2. Continue to build supply-side relationships

Export controls are more effective if a wider range of states agree to implement them. Since February 2022, the US and key partners have built a coalition to implement sanctions against Russia. North Korea should also be factored into this coalition-building, especially given Pyongyang’s growing relationship with Russia. Other forums may also be useful in this context. Regarding Iran, an October 2023 joint statement on ballistic missile activities was released by the US and a group of “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)-endorsing states” the same day that restrictions under UNSC 2231 expired. Forums such as the PSI may provide opportunities for coordination, given that Russia is a member of other forums where illicit procurement is discussed, such as the NSG and the MTCR.

3. Replace the dissolved UN PoE

The demise of the UN PoE in April 2024 was a blow for the sanctions regime. However, the PoE’s reports were also heavily constrained by the Russian and Chinese panel members. For example, the 2024 report has minimal references to the recent large-scale arms and missile transfers from North Korea to Russia, which were in breach of the arms embargo. A new body needs to replace the PoE and continue its role in investigating breaches of sanctions and putting valuable information into the public domain. A spectrum of options is available, each with pros and cons. Key trade-offs in any solution will need to be balanced between a broad, official – and likely constrained – UN body with greater powers to solicit information and legitimacy, perhaps through a UN General Assembly monitoring arrangement, and an unofficial body outside the UN with greater freedom and less legitimacy. Other non-UN forums could also form the basis of an effort, for example the G7 or the PSI, although each will bring its own challenges.

4. Apply open source intelligence to procurement networks

Many of North Korea’s illicit networks have either been uncovered or knowledge of them has been expanded by open source intelligence. This has been used by the PoE, as well as non-governmental organisations, think tanks and academia. Most recently, open sources have shed light on Russian arms purchases from North Korea. Further resources should be devoted to ongoing open source efforts to explore North Korea’s trading networks, particularly those in China and Russia, as well as connections to its remaining diplomatic networks. Business-to-business websites have provided insights into North Korea’s nuclear marketing activities in the past and may also provide insights into procurement. More resources should be dedicated to ongoing efforts and starting new efforts, potentially in conjunction with a body replacing the PoE.

5. Continue UN sanctions outreach

Outreach on UN sanctions by the US and partners should continue, to ensure that third countries see the importance these states continue to place on a North Korea sanctions regime. This should include outreach on broader sanctions issues, as well as illicit procurement and proliferation finance. Funding states should work together to coordinate their outreach efforts to ensure maximum efficiency.

6. Employ new tools

New tools should be used to complement this outreach. These include those collating the insights of open source investigation and understanding the entities involved in North Korea’s networks and their corporate structures. This would allow governments to better dig into cases, and the private sector to conduct due diligence and understand their risk exposure. RUSI’s DPRK Reports Database, which collates data on entities from the PoE reports in a structured way – previously unavailable outside the near 6,000 pages of the PoE reports – is an example of an innovative solution that can have real-world benefits for governments, the private sector and researchers.

7. Engage “chokepoint” manufacturers

Despite the debatable utility of the “chokepoint” terminology, the evidence suggests that North Korea does still seek certain items from outside China and Russia. This likely includes certain types of machine tools, and extensive microelectronics. There is much to gain from continuing to engage the private sector, from raising awareness, helping to understand procurement methods and identifying suspicious enquiries. This engagement could also be undertaken jointly on issues related to North Korean, Russian, Iranian and even Chinese illicit procurement.

8. Engage softer targets on cyber security

National governments should make efforts to engage softer targets, such as start-ups, research institutions and universities, that hold sensitive information, particularly about emerging technologies that North Korea is pursuing, on the threat posed by North Korea’s cyber efforts and relevant cyber-security measures.

9. Challenge the North Korea–Russia relationship

The burgeoning relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang poses a significant proliferation risk, given Russia’s technology capability and need for weapons and materiel. Russia, and previously the Soviet Union, have historically played a role in nonproliferation efforts, so the willingness to provide North Korea with any technology it requests should not be assumed. North Korea also needs other, more benign, commodities, such as food and fertiliser, as well as strategic technology, so technology transfers are not a given. In view of this, there may be opportunities for quid pro quos with Russia to limit the transfer of nuclear and missile technologies to North Korea – although this is unlikely. Furthermore, the issue of Russia–North Korea bilateral strategic trade could be linked, for example, to potential South Korean provision of missile systems to Ukraine for use against Russia.

10. Consider further use of extraterritorial tools

The US, and to a lesser degree its partners, should consider the use of other extraterritorial tools that have been developed and tested on a handful of nodes in WMD-related procurement networks in China and Russia. However, careful consideration should be made regarding possible political and diplomatic blowback.

Daniel Salisbury is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is currently undertaking a three-year research project on arms embargos as part of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship.